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Changing Meanings of “German”  
in Habsburg Central Europe
◆   Pieter M. Judson   ◆
How might we usefully examine the relations between German and non-German- 
communities in Eastern Europe during the nineteenth century without imposing a 
modern nation-centered perspective on those relations? How did German commu-
nities or individuals differentiate themselves from their non-German neighbors, if 
at all? More importantly, how did popular understandings of what it meant to be a 
German (or German-speaking) change during the nineteenth century? And how did 
such ideas about national identity become the basis for a cultural and social politics 
of separation within and among communities in many parts of Eastern Europe? This 
essay tries to suggest some useful ways of thinking about German-speakers, their 
changing conceptions of themselves and of their non-German-speaking neighbors 
in the broad geographic region known as East Central Europe during the long nine-
teenth century (1789–1914), using examples drawn primarily from the Habsburg 
Monarchy. In particular the essay contrasts conceptual changes about identity among 
nationalists to the ongoing realities of daily life in multilingual regions, demonstrat-
ing unevenness in the development of a consistent, coherent, and popular German 
national identity. By the end of the nineteenth century German nationalist media, 
politicians and organizations all framed daily life in the region in terms of ongoing 
battles among nations. They attributed local incidents of violence to nationalist ani-
mosities and portrayed the local world in terms of nationalist conflict. Yet despite 
their best efforts the nation remained an object of indifference, ambivalence, and only 
occasional interest among most inhabitants of East Central Europe.
During the nineteenth century, ideas about national identity first became po-
liticized and popularized among large, socially diverse populations.1 This process was 
anything but predictable or linear in nature, nor did it take place in a consistent or 
similar manner across the region. Despite the claims of nationalists to the contrary, 
the process did not reflect deeper transhistorical features somehow embedded in the 
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region or in the peoples who have inhabited it. The particular character of local society 
produced particular local beliefs about national identity, and these often varied widely 
within broadly defined national communities. Considering oneself to be a German 
in one part of Eastern Europe, for example, might involve a completely different set 
of shared or imagined qualities than it did in another part of Eastern Europe. 
For social scientists, journalists, and politicians, the challenge of defining who 
was considered a German national and what political meanings that label conveyed 
appeared to be solved only by the end of the First World War. Post-1918 European 
governments increasingly categorized their populations according to particular ethnic 
attributes, often as a means to determine which groups should enjoy the full rights of 
citizenship. State policies that linked the full exercise of citizenship rights to member-
ship in a national community helped to popularize national identities among their 
own populations even more. By the mid-twentieth century, radical policies of ethnic 
cleansing, discrimination against linguistic or religious minorities, and wholesale 
expulsions, not to mention genocide, had indelibly imprinted formerly abstract cat-
egories on the experiences, relationships, and self-understandings of many Europeans, 
including the inhabitants of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Since our period largely predates the twentieth-century introduction of identity 
cards, official systems of national ascription or ethnic attribution, it is far more dif-
ficult to determine which people considered themselves to be German or German 
national in the nineteenth century and what exactly they meant by that label.2 On the 
other hand, those practices of ethnic or national attribution that underlay twentieth-
century government policies certainly developed from ways of thinking about large 
populations that had originated in the second half of the nineteenth century. Such 
ways of thinking about populations—in terms of ethnically or linguistically defined 
nations—in turn originated both at the level of state policy and at the level of popular 
social movements. They resulted both from state centralization initiatives—often not 
immediately concerned with determining national belonging—and in many regions 
from a rise of popular participation in local, regional, and state politics. In this essay I 
try to suggest how these varied factors taken together produced new understandings 
of identity, often making those identities into the basis of new forms of politics. After 
an introductory discussion I propose to analyze debates about the meaning of nation 
from the Austrian half of the Habsburg Monarchy, drawn from two particular mo-
ments: the revolutions of 1848 and the end of the nineteenth century, when politics 
became both nationalized and popular in character.
Nation itself was a relatively recent form of popular self-identification in the nine-
teenth-century world. The term “nation” meant many things in 1789, but few of these 
approached the mass-oriented ethnic, linguistic, religious, or territorial understand-
ings of the term that had become standard by 1914. Some early-nineteenth-century 
definitions of nations, such as the Magyar or Polish, referred quite specifically to the 
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traditional privileges enjoyed by corporately defined social groups within a polity. 
In cases such as these “the nation” referred to the gentry and aristocracy of a given 
state or province. Yet the restless century of industrialization, urbanization, increased 
communication, consumption, and movement in Europe produced a considerable 
expansion of the literate public, an explosion of popular media, and the rapid growth 
of mass politics in the region. These developments both informed and transformed 
the very meanings of terms like “Magyar,” “Polish,” and “German,” as such terms 
came to apply to entire populations rather than to specific social groups. Thus the 
nineteenth-century context of growing mass political involvement helped to produce 
the ambition both among nationalist activists and some regimes to realize the nation 
in every individual.3
In many parts of Europe imperial regimes had often relied on corporate-based 
alliances with local elites to impose their rule more effectively among their diverse 
territories, as, for example, with the Russian government’s relationship to Baltic Ger-
man-speaking communities. During the nineteenth century, however, many regimes 
turned increasingly to the use of linguistic, religious, or national categories as a way to 
impose more centralized and consistent forms of administrative rule over local popula-
tions. For the centralizing regime, often absolute in its pretensions, the quality of rule, 
so to speak, had to be consistent and universal, no matter the type of subject to which 
it was applied. Liberal theory too demanded a legal equality and equivalent treatment 
among all subjects of a ruler. Both of these developments could well make use of the 
more universal idea of nation, or even of religion or cultural tradition, as a means of 
reforging links between government and local society. Clearly none of these newer 
concepts (nation, religion, culture) was actually universal in scope when applied to real 
situations. Nor did most regimes take easily to visions of community that differed so 
radically from earlier understandings of the bases for community or society. 
When an imperial government that had largely relied on alliances with local 
elites began instead to differentiate peoples by means of language use or religion, the 
change wreaked havoc on previous social alliances, threatening as it did the traditional 
shape of local social relations. In reaction to such policies, a local elite social group 
(like those Baltic German-speakers) often redefined its own traditional social status 
more consciously in terms of linguistic, religious, and cultural traditions rather than 
according to the privileged functions it had played within the empire. Local social 
groups could respond both defensively and opportunistically to the ideological and 
political spaces created when regimes invoked nationalist, cultural, or religious defini-
tions of community. In the Prussian partition of Poland, for example, the government 
eventually came to use the issue of popular national identity as part of a larger strategy 
to undermine the power of traditional elites over the local economy. Constructing a 
greater sense of loyalty to their rulers based on language use or religious practice among 
the lowest classes, like the transfer of property from its former owners, appeared to 
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enhance the centralizing power of the imperial state. But such a strategy carried with 
it serious long-term risks linked to the mobilization of a mass base as well. In the 
Prussian case, policies of Germanization in the late nineteenth century only helped 
to produce a new, mass-based sense of Polish identity that spread well beyond the 
traditional members of the Polish nation (the gentry) to peasants, artisans, and work-
ers. This created a much broader and more socially unified basis for opposition to the 
regime.4 At the same time, the Prussian regime’s focus on policies of Germanization 
lent ammunition to its German nationalist critics, who contended that only the most 
extreme policies could effectively achieve the government’s goals.
In the new German Empire after 1871, radical activists’ own attempts to produce 
a stronger public appreciation for the importance of Germanness “from below” gained 
some reluctant support from local, state, and federal government agencies, particularly 
in multilingual regions. The Kulturkampf in its popular dimensions also contributed 
to the popularization of German nationalist efforts, since Polish nationalism in Prus-
sia rested increasingly on identification with the local practice of Catholicism. Yet in 
Germany official government efforts to Germanize non-German-speaking peoples 
remained mitigated by practical concerns of state that outweighed the single-minded 
engagement of nationalist activists. Nationalist activists consistently demanded more 
radical policies of Germanization in the East precisely because they rarely gained the 
degree of financial or ideological support from the government for which they had 
hoped.5 In this case we can see that the popular discourses used to debate issues of 
nationalization and the radical proposals that became policy in the twentieth century 
did not dominate government policy in the nineteenth century. If the origins of 
extreme policies of nationalist citizenship can be seen in the nineteenth century, the 
particular ways in which they became policy in the twentieth century were certainly 
not inevitable or even foreseeable. 
In the case of the Habsburg Monarchy, where political centralization also 
gradually replaced traditional reliance on local elites, state policy before 1848 was 
not defined in modern ethnic or national terms. As we shall see, however, linguistic 
policy linked to administrative centralization did help to produce the rise of mass 
national identities. 
The popularization of German nationalist identities and politics in the Habsburg 
Monarchy in the nineteenth century proceeded from several complex sources. 
However, even as we examine processes of nationalization, we also need to consider 
a different and perhaps more vexing question. What, after all, did the term “Ger-
man” as a signifier of identity mean to people in communities throughout Central 
and Eastern Europe? Who could be considered a German, and on what basis? By 
the end of the nineteenth century was there a common understanding among self-
proclaimed Germans about what constituted their unique identity and who might 
share in it? When we invoke the term “German” or “German nationalist,” we are 
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not using terms whose meanings are self-evident to observers or consistently de-
fined throughout the region. Even to those who may have identified themselves as 
“Germans” in the nineteenth century, whether in the Habsburg Monarchy or in the 
eastern border regions of Prussia, the meanings of the term were hardly transparent, 
self-explanatory or uncontroversial. For today’s reader, the term conveys a deceptively 
(easy) empirical sense of familiarity. We presume that Germans are easily recognizable 
when they appear in the historical record, and we know that they were present in 
several regions of nineteenth-century Central and Eastern Europe. Yet the empirical 
confidence we feel in the object of our research tends to dissolve upon closer inspection 
of the nineteenth-century individuals and communities who constitute the objects 
of our study. When the historical record yields examples of literate individuals who 
self-consciously referred to themselves as members of a larger German community or 
nation, these individuals usually defined their Germanness in ways that neither we nor 
self-defined Germans from other regions would necessarily find familiar. Germanness 
as a quality often signified a system of social and cultural values that helped people 
to mark their particular place in local society. The particularities of local conditions 
therefore often shaped local understandings of the term “German.” The notion that 
Germans constituted a recognizable and well-defined group of people who shared a 
common sense of self-identification throughout Central and Eastern Europe derives 
largely from the efforts of nineteenth-century nationalist activists themselves who 
sought to create an interregional and unified German nation. 
At the outset of the nineteenth century the term “German” would have been 
understood very differently in particular regions and at different levels of society. At 
one level the rise of a German literary culture in the eighteenth century spoke to a 
growing, socially relatively homogenous reading public across Central and Eastern 
Europe. At another level some activists passionately believed that the inhabitants of 
the various German states constituted a nation that could potentially form its own 
unified state to rival France or England. For others, as with Lutherans in northern 
Hungary or Galicia, being German meant professing a particular religious tradition 
in a region where most people practiced a different religion. Being German in Tyrol 
meant practicing a particularly orthodox form of Catholicism, while in Styria it often 
implied a skepticism toward the Catholic hierarchy.6 Inhabitants of other regions 
called themselves Germans because education in and knowledge of German culture 
constituted a local form of cultural capital that offered social status and mobility 
to those who adopted it. As a form of identity that was often situationally defined, 
when it was considered at all, Germanness rarely referred to qualities or interests that 
transcended a local perspective. This is especially evident from the nature of the task 
that faced German nationalist activists in both the German Empire and the Habsburg 
Monarchy: to convince Germans in individual localities to see themselves in terms 
of their commonalties with a larger interregional nation. 
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If those who saw themselves as Germans nevertheless used the term in diverse 
ways to express very different kinds of identities, should we treat them as constitut-
ing a single group? If, for example, people who could speak or read German did not 
think of themselves as Germans, can we usefully refer to them as Germans? We must 
recall that in the nineteenth century Germans as a group existed only as an analytic 
tool for our purposes and not as a substantial reality. 7 This caveat also extends to 
those forms of difference that we presume must have constituted sources of differ-
ence in identity for nineteenth-century individuals. To imagine that certain social or 
cultural differences in the past inevitably produced the national differences we see in 
the present is to impose a national teleology on the evidence. If nations and national 
identities are invented, they do not necessarily need to be organized around some 
transhistorical local form of difference, as the work of several historians of the region 
remind us.8 In fact, the search for transhistorical differences (as a key to explaining later 
ethnic or national conflict) is an ahistoric undertaking that repeats the claims made 
by nineteenth-century “national awakeners.” They, after all, believed that awareness 
of differences needed only to be aroused among the broader population to produce 
inevitable forms of national consciousness. In fact, it is the processes outlined earlier, 
the interactions between state policy and local initiative that gave larger social mean-
ing to local forms of difference like language use.
If Germans in the nineteenth century did not constitute a self-consciously 
bounded group of people, plenty of activists, social scientists, philosophers, and his-
torians, among others, nevertheless worked hard to realize the goal of creating such 
a group. As the public sphere of political, economic, social and cultural engagement 
pushed beyond the walls of rural small towns in the nineteenth century, nationalist 
activists increasingly worked to forge popular group loyalties to a greater German 
nation that would be shared by an interregional public. Still, as scholarship on the 
nineteenth century concept of Heimat reminds us, when people called themselves (or 
others) Germans during the nineteenth century, they often used the term to refer to 
a set of shared qualities that remained defined by local circumstances and traditions. 
They did not necessarily think of themselves as part of an interregional culture.9 
One avenue of approach to investigating the Germans in nineteenth-century 
Central and Eastern Europe is to analyze the changing popular meanings of the terms 
“German” and “Germans” as they were used at all levels of public life during the 
nineteenth century. In the next two sections of this essay I look at specific approaches 
to this question, one from 1848 and the other from the late nineteenth century in 
Habsburg Austria. Both of these historical moments witnessed renewed public debate 
over the meanings of “the Germans” and “Germanness,” and a few examples will 
suffice to show both the early diversity of meaning of the terms, and also the ways 
the use of the terms and their meanings changed over fifty years. 
The conflicts over the meanings of a German nation in 1848 engaged a limited 
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stratum of society. The efforts of this stratum built in part on an appropriation of 
Habsburg state modernization processes that were rooted in moral, intellectual, and 
social reform visions of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. As Arnold Sup-
pan points out in his essay, the eighteenth-century reform efforts of Maria Theresa 
and particularly Joseph II produced policies that treated the German language as the 
new lingua franca (to replace Latin) of the Habsburgs’ culturally diverse holdings. 
The reformers’ goals—to increase the coherence of administration, the productiv-
ity, loyalty, and moral capacities of their subjects through increased educational and 
economic opportunities—all produced policies favorable to German language use at 
every level of society, although not necessarily unfavorable to the use of other local 
languages as well.10 
It is not difficult to see how early German nationalists conflated the reformers’ 
focus on the utility of the German language with the alleged cultural and later the 
national qualities of those who used this language. German nationalists adopted this 
sense of cultural leadership in part as a political response to the claims of the Magyar, 
Polish, and later Czech nationalists who opposed Habsburg centralization and saw 
their interests best reflected in decentralized structures. The functional importance 
of the German language to the centralized empire became the foundation for several 
arguments promoting the political interests of German-speakers as such. But one 
should be wary of confusing the terms “German-speaker” with “German,” since 
many Magyar and Czech nationalists in the early nineteenth century, for example, 
spoke German fluently, and did not define their nationalist loyalties in terms of their 
linguistic competence.11 Furthermore, since the term “nation” had traditionally re-
ferred to a political corporation and not a linguistically defined community, it is not 
surprising to hear speakers of one language around 1800 declaring their loyalty to 
a nation represented by a different language. We have only to think of those urban 
German-speakers in the Prussian partition of Poland who proclaimed their loyalty 
to Poland against their region’s absorption by Prussia.12 Examples such as this also 
remind us that throughout the nineteenth century, differences in religious, regional, 
or class identification often determined social loyalties far more powerfully than dif-
ferences in language use.
What range of cultural qualities did the term “German” connote in a local social 
context by 1848? Did it also refer somehow to an interregional community of Ger-
mans? The sudden profusion of public political debate unleashed by the revolution 
sharply conveyed diverse contemporary meanings of concepts like nation, Germans, 
Germanness, and Germany in the territories of the Habsburg Monarchy. Almost 
overnight, these concepts became an integral part of the popular rhetoric used to 
demand political, economic, and social reform in ways that had been impossible before 
the revolution terminated the Vormärz censorship regime. In 1848, most civically 
engaged people in Austria appear to have agreed that nationhood was inextricably 
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linked to the pressing issues of personal, community, political and social freedom. 
Most revolutionaries conceded that without the guarantee of such liberal freedoms, 
national consciousness could not be spread and national greatness certainly could 
not be attained. Many historians of 1848, however, tended to present liberalism and 
national rights as alternatives to each other, even if allegedly naïve political actors at 
the time did not understand the inevitability of this dichotomy. According to this 
version of events, individuals and parties eventually had to choose between their liberal 
and their national commitments.13 The 1848ers, however, did not understand the 
issues in quite such binary terms. Mid-nineteenth century activists more often than 
not conceived national development and political freedoms as mutually constitutive 
of each other. One could not exist without the other; these were not separate or 
separable issues. Most bourgeois nationalists (Czech, German, Slovene) believed that 
the development of their nation depended on the moral progress of their people, and 
such progress—to be accomplished above all through civic education—could not 
be guaranteed without the benefit of basic civil rights and the experience of political 
participation.
When the Viennese German nationalist newspaper Schwarz-Roth-Gold com-
plained about peasant apathy to the nation in August 1848, it did so in terms that 
linked national identity inextricably to progressive political and moral values. “Tradi-
tional education made people stupid. The majority of Austrian peasants does not even 
know that there is a Germany and that it is their fatherland! . . . Traditional forms 
of education did not want to . . . provide our children with the example of the free 
men of their national past, out of fear that it would teach them [to think] indepen-
dently.”14 It was the very quality of freedom that characterized everything having to 
do with nation, and this link of liberal ideas to national identity forged a concept of 
nation far different from the concepts we encounter around 1900. This may help us 
to understand why the statutes of several German nationalist organizations in 1848, 
for example, made membership available to “any Austrian citizen without regard to 
religion, nationality, or estate.”15 How could membership in a German nationalist 
organization be open to individuals of “any nationality?” Clearly the activists who 
formulated these statutes did not wish to limit membership in a German nation to 
those who were German-speakers or who felt themselves to be German, but rather 
opened their community to those who shared their cultural values and political 
commitment.
If political activists understood a German national community as one that was 
open to all who partook of their idealism, then the second point to understand about 
1848 is how very few people actually shared a sense of national consciousness. Not 
only did very few peasants express a sense of national belonging, as the quotation 
above demonstrates, but those who did see themselves as part of a nation often defined 
that nation in highly parochial terms. The prominence of nation in public discussions 
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should not blind us to the deeply local ways in which it was conceived and under-
stood. Rather than speak of the Germans in East Central Europe, when it comes to 
1848 we can perhaps speak of those Tyrolers, Upper Austrians, Styrians, Bohemians, 
or Moravians who also considered themselves to be German. Activists who sought 
to spread national enlightenment to the peasantry in 1848 usually formulated their 
appeals in terms of highly localized interests. This constituted a strategic choice, but 
it also reflected the beliefs and experiences of the nationalists themselves. In very few 
places (Vienna, Graz) did discussions of nation transcend local understandings to 
incorporate broader political and social visions. When, for example, the young Karl 
Stremayr, a law student at the University of Graz, ran for election to the Frankfurt 
Parliament, a body whose task after all was the construction of a German nation-state, 
his speech to local peasant voters hardly mentioned Germany. Instead, he focused 
on the need to end the feudal economic system and the absolutist regime, and on 
his loyalty to the emperor.16 
This situational understanding of nation also permeated discussions among 
activists who held more radical nationalist positions in towns where nationalist con-
flict between different groups had broken out. The Slovene historian Peter Vodopivec 
recounts one such example of local tradition shaping nationalist positions in southern 
Styria, where German-speakers and Slovene-speakers often lived in close proximity. 
In 1848, Slovene nationalists in Ljubljana/Laibach (in neighboring Krain province) 
demanded the creation of a new province that would unite all Slovenes in the mon-
archy. Several Slovene nationalists in Styria, however, opposed the division of their 
traditional province along national lines. Instead of creating a Slovene province with 
its own diet, the Styrian Slovenes promoted greater national reconciliation and equal-
ity among nations within Styria. A poem dating from 1848 and cited by Vodopivec 
captures a very different kind of nationalist agenda and includes the following lines 
(written alternately in Slovene and German): 
How happy are we brothers, 
in beautiful Styria, 
we need not fear any ill, 
our unity makes us strong, 
the knowledge of both languages, 
this promotes commerce, 
to go our separate ways, 
would harm us all.17 
German-speaking deputies to the Styrian diet charged with creating a new pro-
vincial constitution reacted bitterly when Slovene nationalists displayed their Slavic 
red-white-and-blue colors publicly or founded a Slovene nationalist association in 
Graz, seeing such actions as public challenges to German and liberal ideals.18 On 
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the other hand, the German-speaking deputies in Graz treated Slovene speakers (as 
opposed to Slovene nationalists) as trustworthy political allies, agreeing to publish 
Slovene language translations of the diet’s proceedings in local German newspapers 
in order to make the legislative session more accessible. “Many of the Slovenes who 
read the Graz papers are very intelligent people,” noted one German liberal deputy 
to the diet, and appending the translations would “give them more trust in us.”19
These examples suggest that at mid-century, local differences in language use did 
not define community relations and identities as fully as later nationalists believed they 
should. In 1848 local relations and familiarity still appear to have counted far more 
than any abstract interregional sense of nation. At the same time, if local differences 
in language use did not convey incommensurable differences, and bilingualism often 
appeared to be the norm, then local examples of intermarriage and social interaction 
between users of different languages would not have seemed remarkable either. For 
this reason too, definitions of Germanness remained open and vague, and liberal 
in their relations to other nations. Again, from the pages of Schwarz-Roth-Gold, 
one writer in July 1848 underlined this openness, claiming that membership in the 
nation “is based not simply on the soil of birth or language of culture, but rather 
on . . . nobility of action and the worthiness of conviction.” Those who sought out 
education for themselves and their children and demonstrated their commitment to 
humanistic values could indeed become German. In fact, the 1848ers believed that 
this same set of moral qualities that defined their nation would enable it successfully 
to regulate relations among all the other nations within the Austrian Empire. “We 
want a German Austria . . . a powerful leader for all our brother nationalities, not 
through [coercive] power . . . but rather through the voluntary respect that we earn 
when we deal in freedom and humanity.”20
Yet even as German nationalists conceived their nation in open and liberal 
terms, they, and their counterparts in other movements, faced serious political issues 
that appear to us to have almost guaranteed the development of mutual antagonism 
among movements. The Herculean task of reconstituting political and social order on 
a new basis, as manifested in the efforts of the Frankfurt and Vienna (later Kremsier) 
parliaments, the short-lived Slav congress, the town councils and provincial diets, all 
but guaranteed that practical issues of language use would create a serious political 
bone of contention. German nationalists had trouble understanding the protests of 
those who sought to undo the earlier attempts to make German a lingua franca for 
the empire. It is perhaps a testimony to the narrow social basis of nationalist activists, 
men who had much more in common than they cared to admit, that they maintained 
a common vision of liberal freedoms in the Kremsier draft and refused to allow their 
efforts to be derailed by nationalist conflict. It was precisely the issue of language use 
in government and administration that created a space for the political activism that 
fundamentally divided nationalists by the late nineteenth century.
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In the fifty years following the revolutions of 1848, far more people in the Austrian 
Empire became actively involved in a public sphere whose limits grew well beyond 
the boundaries of village or region. Nineteenth-century governments too, continued 
on the path of centralized state building that had been initiated by their reforming 
predecessors of the eighteenth century. In the aftermath of the revolution the Habsburg 
regime had even revived its efforts to impose greater coherence on regional and lo-
cal administration through expanded use of German in the bureaucracy. This new 
insistence on German as the language of governance in the 1850s provoked effective 
opposition in Hungary. Government centralization in Austria, however, went well 
beyond language use in the civil service to encompass education reform, development 
of a transportation and communications infrastructure for the entire empire, and 
targeted investment to promote industrialization.
Constitutional reform in the 1860s loosened censorship, expanded public 
education and associational life significantly, and increased popular participation in 
politics. The expansion of communications and transportation infrastructures often 
recast political questions in interregional as opposed to local terms. Through the 
efforts of local associations, local media and political parties, more and more Aus-
trians joined public life in some capacity or other. With the Compromise of 1867, 
the Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy gradually adopted nationalizing policies 
typical of nation-states like France, Germany, or Italy. The empire that formed the 
Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy, however, remained officially anational (later 
multinational). This state experienced a steady rise in mass political participation, 
culminating with the implementation of universal manhood suffrage for parliamen-
tary elections in 1907. 
In Austrian society, attempts to categorize and mobilize people in ethnic or 
national terms emerged from popular nationalist political initiatives after 1848 and 
not directly from the offices of government agencies. Nevertheless, the ongoing mod-
ernizing efforts of the state played a critical, if unwitting, role in the nationalization 
of Austrian society in the late nineteenth century. As nationalist political movements 
competed within the framework of the new constitutional system to increase their 
electoral constituencies in an age of growing mass-based politics, they sought to 
make the idea of national identity relevant to every aspect of life. They succeeded at 
least in nationalizing political life by demanding the application of constitutional 
guarantees of linguistic equality to an ever-expanding set of institutions. From edu-
cational to judicial institutions, from administrative to commercial practices, no 
possible corner of public life remained immune to the demands of nationalists. The 
late-nineteenth-century infusion of nationalist content into public life ranged from 
the provision of welfare benefits or access to education at all levels to local forms of 
economic competition and even to patterns of consumption. 
To realize this nationalization of public life as fully as possible, however, each 
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group had to define a set of shared qualities that would help newly politicized 
Austrians to understand to which nation they belonged and why. Additionally, the 
dynamic of nationalist political competition within Austria after 1867 caused the 
leaders of each group regularly to insist that its needs were incommensurable with 
those of competing nations and that a gulf of enormous proportions separated the 
members of one nation from another. Such claims of differences among populations 
were made vigorously and often, in part because national belonging continued to 
mean very little to most nineteenth-century Austrians as they went about their daily 
routines. And while ordinary Austrians may have reacted with interest or indifference 
to claims about the importance of national loyalties, nationalist activists continued 
to develop and refine their claims about national differences, how they manifested 
themselves in daily life, and how they could be measured scientifically. 
By 1900 both ideas about nation and the numbers of people who felt allegiance 
to nations had changed dramatically throughout East Central Europe. The character 
of ideas about Germanness changed too, in part because of the growing populariza-
tion of politics, in part because of the 1867 Compromise, which had recognized 
the rights of the Hungarian nation, and in part because of the activism of other 
nationalist groups in the empire, particularly the Czech nationalists. The role of the 
German language and culture as a broadly unifying factor in Austrian public life 
declined considerably as Slav nationalists agitated successfully in the legislatures and 
the courts for the use of their languages in schools, universities, the courts, and the 
civil service. German might remain the inner, interregional language of the imperial 
bureaucracy and of the military, but its advantages as a universal lingua franca in the 
region had diminished. 
Many German nationalists clung uneasily to the traditional claim of German 
language and culture as somehow more culturally advanced and therefore more valu-
able than the other languages in public use in the monarchy. With the establishment 
of Polish and Czech universities at L’viv/Lwów/Lemberg and Prague, with Italian 
nationalist demands for an Italian-language law faculty and Slovene demands for a 
university in Ljubljana, the position of German as the undisputed vehicle of culture, 
progress, and modernity was less self-evident. As a result, German nationalist asser-
tions of their nation’s Kulturträger status in East Central Europe became increasingly 
strident. As German nationalists became more defensive about the position of their 
language and culture in the monarchy, they began to adopt new arguments to justify 
their leading position. They did not abandon arguments about the universality of 
their nation, and except for the anti-Semites among them, they continued to welcome 
anyone into its ranks. Yet at the same time, they articulated some new arguments that 
located specific spaces as German and that stressed the incommensurable differences 
that separated theirs from other cultures. Speakers of other languages, especially in the 
cities, seemed less and less likely to choose to become German for the sake of social 
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mobility, now that they had other options available to them in other languages.21 
Consequently, the German nationalist community became more inward-looking and 
exclusive in its rhetoric. The greater German nationalist focus on national ownership 
of territory and on the fundamental differences that allegedly separated nations also 
derived from a growing appreciation of the importance of numbers, rather than of 
“quality” or cultural status, in influencing local and imperial politics. Elections had 
to be won if control by one nationalist group or another was to be exercised effec-
tively. Although a curial system that favored wealthier and better-educated citizens 
dominated local municipal and regional elections, activists nevertheless sought to 
mobilize every possible voter in every curia for their purposes.22 
After 1848, many government policies of modernization depended on initia-
tives in the social sciences that sought to organize and map populations according to 
their linguistic and religious character, for the purpose of applying social policy more 
effectively.23 Categorization of local populations according to language use in the im-
perial census, for example, became valuable tools for the development of local school 
and, later, welfare policies after the passage of the 1867 constitution in Austria. Since 
the constitution had promised equal treatment to the speakers of Austria’s different 
languages, this required setting up schools in native languages wherever possible.24 
Over time, the implementation of this guarantee and its application to other areas 
of public life (courts, civil service) required increased statistical knowledge about the 
linguistic make-up of local populations. 
In the 1870s, government statisticians developed a census apparatus that would 
question Austrians, among other things, about their language of everyday use.25 The 
imperial government had no wish to promote nationalist agitation or the importance 
of national identity, however indirectly, through the census. Yet its attempt at lin-
guistic categorization for limited policy purposes produced several unintended side 
effects, including new opportunities for nationalist politicians. Statistical studies 
like the decennial census did not automatically produce nations through a kind of 
Foucauldian effect, but they certainly did produce new opportunities for nation-
building, which creative nationalist politicians readily exploited. In early debates 
over the particular form of the census, nationalists had complained vigorously that it 
asked respondents for their language of daily use instead of for their mother tongue 
or their nationality. The nationalists’ failure to impose national categories on the 
census, however, did not daunt activists in the least. They simply used other tools at 
their disposal—press, political agitation, mass meetings—to link language usage in 
the census to broader, newly invented mass nationalist identities. The nationalists 
appropriated census categories like “language of daily use” in order to mobilize people 
on the basis of common qualities. Already in the 1880s, following the first Austrian 
census, activists claimed that all those who had listed a particular language on the 
census form belonged in fact to that nation. This claim, and the counter-claims it 
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provoked, produced powerful effects in Austrian public life. By 1910 many more 
people believed the language question referred to their nationality—a fixed personal 
identity—rather than to the function of language in their locality. Nationalist activists 
even turned to the courts to challenge the census results for particular localities where 
they believed the national enemy had somehow manipulated the outcome.26 
If nationalists complained that the census did not explicitly ask for the national 
allegiance of its respondents, historians might complain that it made no allowance 
for the many people who used more than one language in families, businesses, or 
daily social lives, to report that critical fact. We have no way of knowing whether 
any of these respondents in fact spoke the language of another nation as well. We 
historians have also validated nationalist claims about the census, however inadver-
tently, by reading it ourselves as if it somehow revealed national self-identification 
among the Austrian population. Histories of the Habsburg Monarchy or East Central 
Europe invariably include maps depicting the languages that a majority of people 
reported in a particular region. Almost always these maps identify their subjects as 
“the Czechs,” “the Germans,” or “the Slovenes,” for example, rather than as “Czech-
speakers,” “German-speakers,” or “Slovene-speakers.”27 This slippage on the printed 
page—from the individual who reported a single language of daily use in the census 
to the presumption of national identity—transforms all people into members of na-
tions, whether they felt that way or not. From there it is a small step to territorialize 
those nations by assigning to them the geographic regions where they appear to have 
constituted a majority. 
Instead of accepting nationalist claims that associated language use on the 
census with a declaration of national identity, historians might more fruitfully ask 
what factors induced some respondents to report one language in a given year in-
stead of another language. How might we explain the choices of those individuals, 
families, and communities who self-consciously practiced a form of bilingualism, 
marrying their German language skills to Czech, Slovene, Polish, or Hungarian (or 
marrying their Czech skills to an acquired knowledge of German)? In some regions 
we know that the same people reported different languages of daily usage in dif-
ferent decennial censuses.28 What situations caused them to report one language 
one year and a different language ten years later? Considering these questions in a 
nineteenth-century context might help us to avoid presuming that such people had 
already developed a single and consistent sense of national identity. It would also 
encourage us to follow Rogers Brubaker’s productive suggestion that we think of 
individual national professions of identity—professions of nationness—as an occa-
sion or as an event rather than as an ongoing process or and unchanging, internal-
ized truth.29 Finally, keeping these questions in mind would help us literally to see 
things differently when we examine the abstract depictions of social scientists that 
map language use onto territory.
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If we consider the information that these abstracted maps, graphs, and charts 
fail to convey to us (bilingualism, situational reporting of linguistic usage), we can 
see one reason why it is so difficult to speak of Germans, German communities, or 
a German nation in nineteenth-century Central and Eastern Europe. Other kinds 
of choices made by individuals, families, and communities also undercut the clear 
assertion of national identity proclaimed for them by contemporary nationalist activ-
ists. Why, for example, did some parents in multilingual regions choose to rear and 
school their children in more than one language? Nationalist activists tried to square 
their version of reality with the social behaviors they encountered by denouncing 
such people as “amphibians,” “national hermaphrodites,” and as psychologically 
deformed opportunists who would sell themselves and their children to the highest 
national bidder. Or they depicted such people as the unfortunate pawns of oppres-
sive employers and landlords who forced them to adopt a different language from 
their authentic one in order to save their job or their apartment. 30 By speaking and 
writing in these terms, nationalists sought to normalize the concept that everyone 
indeed had one authentic national identity. To us, however, the example of people 
who did not easily fit into a nationalist schema points to the fundamental difficulty of 
presuming that language use in the nineteenth century implied a particular national 
community identity. 
Although more people clearly saw themselves as Germans, as part of a larger Ger-
man nation by 1900, the significance of that choice and the meanings with which they 
imbued this choice also remained diverse and often contradictory. The generally swift 
rise of popular literacy and newspapers throughout the empire meant that people far 
away from each other received their news from sources that presented it in a uniform 
context. Far more people who adopted a national identity now shared a comparable 
sense of the meaning of their Germanness and who belonged to their community, than 
earlier in the century. Nevertheless, regional loyalties remained powerful when it came 
to those definitions, and activists often scrambled to paper over several conflicts about 
the character of the German community that had emerged by 1900. Two particularly 
vexing questions that prevented the formation of an ideologically unified German 
nationalist movement involved the role of Jews and the Catholic Church within that 
movement. Several organizations and parties defined their German identity in terms 
of racial, religious, or economic anti-Semitism. Several, including the largest among 
them, remained open to Jewish membership and to a non-racial definition of the Ger-
man community. Many German nationalists in a region like the Tyrol (like Christian 
Socials in Lower and Upper Austria) continued to define their community identity in 
terms of loyalty to the Catholic Church, whereas German nationalist organizations and 
parties elsewhere saw the Church as their nation’s enemy. When these latter organiza-
tions attempted to unify their efforts, as with the first Congress of German Nationalist 
Defense Organizations in 1908, for example, they could not achieve the hoped-for 
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unity, precisely due to the powerful disagreements about these issues, particularly the 
role of Jews.31 While it is true that far more Austrians saw themselves as belonging to 
a German nation in 1900 than had been the case in 1848, they did not agree at all on 
the character or meaning of this nation. 
This essay has attempted to demonstrate that terms like “German” or “nation” car-
ried far more diffuse and locally based meanings for diverse nineteenth-century 
populations than they did to Germans at various points in the twentieth century. 
The study of context, of historical contingency, and of individual circumstance is key 
to determining what individuals and communities adopted what national identities 
over time. So is the idea of nation-ness as event rather than identity. When and in 
what kinds of situations in the nineteenth century did people tend to see themselves 
as national? In what kinds of situations were they indifferent or ambivalent about the 
idea of belonging to a nation? Individuals, families, or even communities may have 
adopted national identities at certain moments, but that did not prevent some of them 
from adopting different identities at other moments, or from expressing complete 
indifference to those identities at yet other moments. Even those who did identify 
themselves consistently as “Germans” throughout this period would not necessarily 
have understood themselves as members of a larger interregional German community, 
one that formed an interconnected, unified cultural and social whole. Their sense 
of their Germanness may have derived from their particular religious practice, their 
local social position, or their degree of education. In the context of specific regional 
and local identities there may indeed have been plenty of self-described Germans to 
be found, but little sense of a larger connection among such groups of individuals. 
Imposing the common term “Germans” on these diverse populations risks compro-
mising the accuracy of our representations of people in the past by flattening out their 
considerable differences to fit them into a broad modern category.32
It is also clear, however, that the requirements of modernizing states and the 
efforts of developing social sciences worked together, however unintentionally, to 
promote the categorization of populations in terms of language use, religious practice, 
and eventually according to the abstract concept of nation. While state policies did 
not alone create nations in the nineteenth century, they often created the available 
political and social spaces where local or regional activists could articulate particular 
interests. Even states like Austria, whose policy opposed the recognition of national 
interests, nevertheless helped to produce the spread of nationalism through promises 
of linguistic and religious equality. The most egregious example of Austrian state policy 
that unintentionally encouraged the process of nationalization of populations was 
undoubtedly the Moravian Compromise of 1905. Undertaken in order to diminish 
the harmful effects of political nationalism on public life, the compromise created 
separate Czech and German electoral lists and school systems. The new law required, 
however, that all Moravians register themselves and their families as either members of 
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the Czech or German nation, thus forcing many who had not previously considered 
themselves to be part of either nation to join one of them.33 
From the perspective of the twentieth century, the history of the nineteenth 
century in Central and Eastern Europe seems to offer a panoramic view of worsening 
relations among neighboring communities that used different languages or practiced 
different religions. What we are seeing, however, is neither the awakening of nations 
nor the end of some kind of idyllic existence characterized by an acceptance of diversity 
or so-called hybrid identities at the local level. The largely rural communities of East 
Central Europe in particular knew nothing of hybridity or multiculturalism because 
they knew nothing of modern nations. What they experienced in their everyday lives 
was completely normal to them and not exceptional. What was exceptional to them, 
however, was the gradual intrusion in their world of outsiders, of civil servants, of 
communications and commercial networks, of new media, of political parties. Even 
in 1848, when popular politics first exploded the cultural fabric of daily life in the 
region, the potential for all-consuming nationalist conflicts to tear society apart re-
mained only a potential. Activists in 1848 were not the activists of 1900. The former 
still defined their world in tangible ways that privileged local interests and interpreta-
tions of the world. For this reason, their nationalisms did not necessarily exclude other 
nationalisms, and given the legal and social conditions of the day, most envisioned 
a society characterized by personal emancipation. By 1900, however, local condi-
tions had changed radically, thanks to the spread of media, the rise of literacy, and a 
remarkable political mobilization. So too had the contents of nationalist ideologies. 
Local interests were now understood by more people to be intimately connected to 
nationalist interests. A broad and abstract concept of nation (whichever version) had 
become part of loyalty to the traditions of place, making local conflict on nationalist 
lines more of a possibility in daily life. 
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